INTRODUCTION
Poland is located in Eastern Europe -the "other Europe"lwhich shares a continent, but seemingly little else, with Western Europe. Most histories of Europe, legal histories included, are ac tually histories of Western Europe only.2 The "euro-centrism" some scholars complain about is, more accurately, a "western euro centrism." The eastern half of the continent is ignored like the em barrassing black sheep of the European family.
Economic historians have described Eastern Europe as a "back ward" place, where feudal and mercantilist economies persisted as Western European economies modernized and industrialized.3 In geopolitical terms, Eastern Europe has been characterized as a re gion of "underdevelopment and dependence," "striving after the 'modernity' seemingly embodied in certain of its western neighbours."4 In the popular imagination Eastern Europe is "the old country". -a region populated by poorly educated and xeno phobic peasants, ruled first by nationalist despots and later by communists.
The communists are gone now, and the countries of Eastern Europe supposedly are "learning" about constitutional democracy. American and West-European "experts" flocked there after the fall of the Berlin Wall (with mostly good intentions) to teach the na-tives about democracy and constitutionalism.5 In many cases, these teachers were as ignorant of local culture and history as they were condescending. As German constitutional law Professor Hans Mengel has stated, however, " [y] ou cannot come in and prescribe a constitution . . .. It comes out of the cultural background. You have to take care of what the society is like in the moment."6 Even internationally renowned legal scholars, such as Richard Posner and Cass Sunstein, have felt obliged to give advice on re forming legal systems to countries about whose histories and cul tures they admittedly know little.7 Judge Posner has urged the "newly liberated" countries of Central and Eastern Europe to focus on those "universal negative" rights which are relatively inexpen sively enforced, such as the right to property.8 Other rights, includ ing some "negative" rights that are taken for granted in relatively wealthy democracies, such as rights that protect against the wrong ful incarceration of innocents, should be disregarded (or only mini mally protected) until they can be better afforded.9 Imagine the reception this kind of economism about the rights of criminal de fendants would likely receive in a country like Poland, where habeas corpus protections were provided for more than half a mil- [Vol. 97:2062 lennium before the imposition of communism,1 0 and where in 1981 as many as 580 of every 100,000 Polish citizens were imprisoned (as compared with 212 per 100,000 in the U.S. and 25 per 100,000 in the Netherlands),11 many of them for no reason other than political dissent.12
Professor Sunstein agrees with Judge Posner about the dangers posed by the adoption of costly "positive" rights in Central and East European constitutions. He considers the combination of " [a] chaotic catalogue of abstractions from the social welfare state" with "traditional rights to religious liberty, free speech, and so on" to be "a large mistake, possibly a disaster."13 Sunstein is particularly con cerned that socioeconomic constitutional rights -such as the right to free medical care and the right to a clean environment -are notoriously difficult to enforce; their lack of enforceability could have a demoralizing effect on society, which could jeopardize the perceived legitimacy of a constitution in toto. Consequently, he has counseled Central and East European countries to set their consti tutional sights on providing "(a) firm liberal rights -free speech, voting rights, protection against abuse of the criminal justice sys tem, religious liberty, barriers to invidious discrimination, property and contract rights; and (b) the preconditions for some kind of mar ket economy." One does not have to disagree with the merits of Sunstein's prescription, however, to recognize that it had little or no chance of being followed for reasons that have to do with history, culture, and existing institutions, all of which his analysis neglects.14 A common constitutional prescription would be unlikely (to say the least) to work for all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These are not homogeneous societies sharing common his tories, cultures, institutions, and values. To the contrary, they are extremely diverse. And it has always been a foregone conclusion that each country would adopt a constitution reflecting its own his tory, culture, and values, and not necessarily those of western advisers.
10. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
11. See PoLAND: A CoUNTRY STUDY 289 (Glenn E. Curtis ed., 1994).
See generally THE LAWYERS CoMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REPRESSION Dis. GUISED AS LAW: HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLAND (1987).
13. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 35. 14. Id. at 35-36. Interestingly, one of Sunstein's arguments against the inclusion of posi tive rights in constitutions is that " [c] onstitutions can be understood as precommitment strate gies, in which nations use a founding document to protect against the most common problems in their usual political processes." Id. at 36. Existing cultural, historical, and institutional influences, however, can be understood as creating preconstitutional precommitment strate gies, which can variously determine the contents of the constitutional precommitment strate gies. No constitution has ever been written on a blank slate. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
Moreover, not one of the postcommunist countries was "starting ... from scratch" in constitution writing, as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor asserted in a 1995 speech. 1 5 Consti tutions, like other institutions, are not composed on blank slates but are shaped by existing social, historical, intellectual, and institu tional forces. As the economist Lee Alston has explained:
Institutions are historically specific, and for this reason it is necessary to be sensitive to historical context. This is particularly true for the dynamics of institutional change. Much of the developmental path of societies is conditioned by their past. Even after revolutions, institu tion builders do not start off in a historical vacuum. At any moment in time, actions are constrained by customs, norms, religious beliefs, and many other inherited institutions. This is as true for the leaders in Eastern Europe today as it was for Augustus Caesar.1 6
Fortunately, some Central and East European countries have en dogenous histories of democratic constitutionalism on which to build.
Consider Poland, the first country to cast off communism, and among the last to enact a wholly new constitution. 1 7 Unbeknownst to most recent would-be advisers, Poland was the second country in the world, and the first in Europe, to adopt a written constitution. 1 8
Not only did Poles enjoy protection against arbitrary arrest and im prisonment almost 250 years before the English supposedly "in vented" habeas corpus, but they elected their Kings by a politically dominant parliament (the Sejm) while the rest of Europe still suf fered absolute monarchs. Consider Poland in light of Mark Brzezinski's 1 9 new book, Th e Struggle fo r Constitutionalism in Poland, which tells the story of how each time the Polish people have been left to their own devices -i.e. , between invasions by Germans, Au stro-Hungarians, Swedes, and Russians -they have established increasingly democratic institutions and protected civil liberties. What follows is a review of Brzezinski's book, an assessment of its contribution to a better understanding of the historically and cul turally contingent nature of the constitution-making process, and an appraisal of its contribution to a less western euro-centric under standing of legal history. Not only is Poland's history of constitu tionalism western in its orientation, but P olish legal and constitutional innovations, particularly those regarding civil and religious liberties, predate similar developments in West European countries. Indeed, during the Renaissance and Reformation eras, Poland's protodemocratic and libertarian legal and political theo ries and practices significantly influenced efforts to reform absolu tist monarchies in Western Europe. And they continue to influence constitutional developments in postcommunist Poland.
See
In conformity to Brzezinski's book, this Review proceeds chron ologically, beginnin g with the unwritten Constitution of Renais sance Poland and concluding with a brief glance at Poland's new postcommunist Constitution, adopted in 1997. Along the way, we will learn several things: first, Poland has had a long, sometimes glorious and sometimes tragic, history of constitutionalism; second, Polish constitutionalism has always been decidedly western in its orientation; third, Poland has been -and continues to be -quite innovative in its constitutional theories and practices, especially in the area of civil liberties; and, finally, Polish constitutionalism has at times been influential in Western Europe. Thus, Polish constitu tional history challenges the western euro-centrism of most legal historians, as well as the conventional wisdom of western lawyers that postcommunist countries are, in Justice O'Connor's terms, "starting .. . from scratch" in designing constitutional govemments. 2 0
BRZEZINSKI'S ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: CONSTITUTIONS AND CoNSTITUTIONALISM
Brzezinski's historical analysis of constitutionalism in Poland is prefaced with an "analytical framework" for assessing constitution alism, which he rightly suggests to be inextricably intertwined with democracy and limited government. He discusses (pp. 7-9) defini tions of the term "constitution" from Aristotle, Giovanni Satori, Carl Friedrich, and Karl Loewenstein, in order to distinguish consti tutions that are so many words on paper (such as Stalinist constitu tions) from those that have real normative effect -those whose "written guarantees are actual practices, enforced over political au thorities" (p. 10). Brzezinski adopts Bonime-Blanc's list of charac teristics denoting "real," "normative" constitutions: constitutional 20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
institutions exist and function as prescribed; constitutional rules governing political practice are "consistently observed"; constitu tional norms, including civil rights and liberties, are enforced against violators; and government power is limited in practice by constitutional institutions such as the separation of powers, checks and balances, and judicial review.2 1
Having asserted that only democratic governments are constitu tional in practice, Brzezinski hastens to add that democracies need not have written constitutions in order to be constitutional (pp. 10-12). The prime example here, of course, is England.22 At the same time, the existence of a formal, written constitution is no sure sign of constitutionalism, as proven by the former communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. Those regimes enacted constitutions that, on paper, were hardly distinguishable from those of western democracies; in some respects, they looked even better. They were not, however, worth the paper they were printed on.23 The commu nist countries of Europe may have had constitutions, but their polit ical systems were not constitutional. This point is critical for understanding Poland's history of constitutionalism. Without Brzezinski's distinction between constitutions and constitutional systems, there would be no formal basis for differentiating Poland's communist Constitution of 1952 from other Polish constitutional documents.
THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY IN RENAISSANCE PoLAND24
Brzezinski appropriately begins his constitutional history of Poland half a millennium before Poland adopted its :first written Constitution in 1791. During the thirteenth century, the Poles be gan developing institutions to limit arbitrary government. By the sixteenth century those institutions had coalesced into a constitu tional system, albeit one based on several fundamental laws rather than a single written constitution. Brzezinski devotes only a few pages to this period, which is unfortunate because, as we shall see, in many respects it was the most remarkable period of Poland's legal and constitutional development. It also provides an important 21. See ANDREA BoNIME-BLANc, SPAIN'S TRANsmoN TO DEMOCRACY: THE PoLmcs OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING 11-12 (1987 Brzezinski too briefly canvasses the fundamental legal and polit ical institutions that constituted Poland's First Republic, but he points out several of the central features of Poland's constitutional system. First, it was a federal system, with regional parliaments (sejmiki) that elected representatives to the national Diet (Sejm).25
These parliamentary bodies were the political arms of Poland's size able nobility (szlachta), which constituted between 7 and 14 percent of the country's total population (numbering 7.5 million at its great est). 2 6 Because only members of the nobility could serve in the re gional sejmiki or the national Sejm, parliamentary policies tended to reflect the szlachta's interests. And the szlachta were primarily interested in protecting their own liberties against the distrusted Crown. 2 7
Like England, sixteenth-century Poland was a parliamentary monarchy. Unlike in England, however, the lion's share of power in Poland was held by the national and regional parliaments; the King was decidedly subordinate. His authority was increasingly cir cumscribed by a series of "privileges" exacted by the Sejm begin ning in the fourteenth century. First, in 1374 King Louis of Anjou granted the Privilege of Kosice, promising not to impose new taxes without nobility's consent. In 1422, Louis's successor, King Jagiello, promised not to confiscate the property of any member of the szlachta without a court order. Eleven years later, he granted the 25. The regional sejm iki played a dominant role in this federal system. They deputized representatives to the national Sejm , but did not give them plenipotentiary powers; rather, deputies were required to follow detailed instructions. Upon their return from the biennial six-week meeting of the Sejm, deputies were required to report to their sejmiki on all deliber ations and actions taken in Warsaw. If it turned out that a deputy deviated from their in structions, the sejmik would often refuse to implement the national Sejm 's enactments. "Thus ultimate political control remained at the local level." Robert I. 27. It is also important to recognize that, unlike in other European countries, there was no legal hierarchy among Poland's nobility; impoverished "petty nobles" had the same quan tum of legal rights as the wealthiest "magnates," including equal rights to vote in the Na tional Assembly. As Field-Marshal Count von Moltke wrote, " [n] o Polish noble was the vassal of a superior lord .... [T] he meanest of them appeared at the diet in the full enjoyment of that power which belonged to all without distinction." FIELD-MARSHAL CouNT voN MOLTKE, POLAND 3 (E.S. Buchheim trans., 1885).
Privilege of Jedlna (Brzezinski refers to it as the Privilege of Kra k6w (p. 33)), which proclaimed, "Neminem captivabimus nisi iure victum -we will not imprison anyone except if convicted by law." 2 8 As Brzezinski notes (p. 33), this was a revolutionary inno vation in civil libertarianism, providing a sizeable percentage of the Polish population with due process-style rights two-and-a-half cen turies before England enacted its first Habeas Corpus Act in 1679.29 Additional Crown concessions at the beginnin g of the sixteenth century decisively shifted the balance of power in Poland in favor of the nobility and their political arm, the Sejm. In 1501 the Sejm firmly established its supremacy by exacting from King Aleksander the power of legislative initiative. This led directly to the adoption in 1505 of the nihil novi "constitution,"30 which prohibited the King from enacting new laws without the Sejm's concurrence. Subse quently, after the death of the last Jagiellonian King, Zygmunt August, in 1572, Poland's nobles completely abolished hereditary monarchy. All subsequent Kings were elected by unanimous vote of all the nobles. Brzezinski points out that " [t] his procedure pre cluded the King from possessing any notion of 'divine right' or royal privilege and initiated the principle that the national sover eignty belongs to the whole nation, not to one individual" (p. 36).
Newly elected kings, prior to coronation, were obliged to swear oaths of allegiance to all previously enacted laws; the principle of religious toleration; the convention of an elected monarchy; the privileges of the nobility; the right of the Sejm to convene regularly and oversee the crown's policies; the nobility's right to approve dec larations of war, foreign treaties, and new taxes; and, finally, the nobility's right of resistance should the King fail to keep his word. These oaths were codified in the first Pacta Conventa, the Acta Henriciana of 1574.31
So, by the sixteenth century the Sejm and its constituency, the nobility, were clearly established as the dominant political forces in Poland. And the nobility exercised its power defensively -to pro tect its liberties. This is most evident in the ancient and infamous mechanism of the liberum veto, which established a rule of unanim ity for parliamentary decisions. A single legislator could prevent the 236-member Sejm from taking action merely by saying "nie pozwalam" ("I do not allow it"). The philosophical basis of this right became the szlachta's credo: "Nierzqdem Po lska stoi" (" It is by unrule that Poland stands").3 2
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the shift of power from Crown to Sejm resulted in an unbalanced power struc ture, with too much power vested in the Parliament and too little executive authority. In fact, the Crown retained substantial power by several mechanisms, which Brzezinski does not explore. First, the King exercised substantial control in the everyday governance of Poland. The Sejm met for only six weeks every two years, leav ing the King in almost unfettered control for the other ninety-eight weeks. In addition, the King's estate was by far the country's larg est; he was lord over one-sixth of Poland's lands and inhabitants.3 3 This was a great source of practical power. Moreover, members of the Senate (the upper house of Poland's National Assembly) were appointed by the King. This served to dilute, to some extent, Crown concessions to the nobility because the King could only be removed from office for violating his loyalty oaths after three warn ings from the Senate.3 4 So Brzezinski is right to conclude (p. 37) that sixteenth-century Poland managed to effect a balance and separation of powers be tween the Sejm and the Crown, making for a constitutional govern ment of limited powers. But sixteenth-century Poland was not a democracy in the modern sense. As Brzezinski points out (p. 34), the Sejm directly represented only the interests of the nobility, and the law formally protected only that group's liberties. Other groups in Polish society -burghers, Jews, and sundry other religious and ethnic minorities -also benefitted from the general atmosphere of liberty and toleration that prevailed in Renaissance Poland. Unfor tunately, Brzezinski's preoccupation with the separation and bal ance of governmental powers leads him to neglect, to some extent, important Polish innovations in civil and religious liberties during the sixteenth century. Indeed, it was Renaissance Poland's ap proach to civil and religious liberties, far more than its balance and separation of governmental powers, that characterized Poland's First Republic and influenced constitutional theory and practice in other European countries. Religious conflict inevitably would have pitted noble against noble, to the advantage of the Crown.
The nobility's motivations, however, were not purely instrumen tal; a real streak of libertarianism runs through their writings. For example, Jan Zamoyski, Chancellor of the Polish Crown during the sixteenth century, wrote, "'I would give half of my life if those who have abandoned the Roman Catholic Church should voluntarily re turn to its pale; but I would prefer giving all my life than to suffer anybody to be constrained to do it, for I would rather die than wit ness such an oppression.' "4 1 King Zygmunt August reflected the religious tolerance of the time when he wrote, "'I am not King of your consciences. I wish to be monarch equally of the sheep and of the goats. I am afr aid of tearing wheat as well as tares.' "4 2 Even the Catholic polemicist Piotr Skarga acquiesced in the general at mosphere of tolerance. His writings lashed out against heretics but repudiated violence: "'Heresy is bad, but our neighbors and good brothers sharing our love of the country know that nothing won by force is durable, that anything secured under duress does not last long. ' "43 Not only was religious toleration state policy in sixteenth century Poland; it was the law, codified in the 1573 Warsaw Confed eration, a sublime but little-known statute reputed to be the first document in European history to constitutionalize religious tolera tion. 44 It provided:
because there is not a small dissension in our country in the matter of the Christian religion, we should like to prevent any harmful sedition that could develop among the people for this reason. What we see in other Kingdoms, we promise to all on our behalf and for our succes sors, for eternity, under oath, faith, honor, and our conscience, that no matter who the dissidents from the [Roman Catholic] religion are, we shall preserve peace among us, and not shed blood for difference in religion or in Church observance. We shall not penalize ourselves for this reason by confiscation of landed estates, by punishment of honor, by imprisonment or exile. We also promise not to help in any way the authorities or officers in such a procedure. We all shall be obliged to oppose the shedding of blood, even if anyone would want to do this for a good reason, under the pretext of a decree or of any court proce dure ....
We have promised for ourselves and for our descendants to seri ously respect and to preserve all those matters under the authority of 41. Quoted in LEDNICKI, supra note 36, at 47 (citing GRAPPIN, supra note 36, at 89). 42. Jd. at 47 (citing p AUL SUPER, EVENTS AND PERSONALITIES IN POLISH HISTORY (1936)).
43. P. SKARGA, UPoMINANIE DO EwANGIELIK6w 33 (1592) quoted in TA ZBIR, supra note 37, at 149.
44. See James Mill er, Th e Sixteenth-Century Roots of the Po lish Democratic Tr adition, in POLISH DEMOCRATI C THOUGHT, supra note 25, at 21. our faith, honor and conscience. And we shall stand up against any one who would like to oppose peace and to spoil public order; we shall stand up against him for his perdition.4 5
These guarantees applied officially only to the nobility but prom ised a degree of religious freedom in Poland found virtually no where else in Europe. Throughout the sixteenth century, only two persons in Poland lost their lives for their religious beliefs as a re sult of legal proceedings.46
Along with (or perhaps as a consequence of) religious freedom came substantial freedom of expression. Throughout the sixteenth century, European intellectuals flocked to Poland, where they could freely express and publish their views. As one immigrant wrote from Poland to a colleague back in Italy in 1561, "'You could live here in accordance with your ideas and preferences, in great, even the greatest freedoms, including writing and publishing. No one is a censor here.' "47 This was an exaggeration. There was official cen sorship in Poland, but it was most often recognized in the breach. Dissident publishing houses flourished in the Polish-Lithuanian Republic. The Polish government published an index of banned books for the first time in the seventeenth century, and it too was rarely enforced. When it was enforced, books were not destroyed but placed in a special closed section of the Jagiellonian University library in Krak6w.48 Before 1627, no Polish nobleman was pun ished for publishing a banned book; and no writer or publisher ever forfeited his life.49
The pervasive freedom of religion and expression was a central and unique virtue of Poland's Renaissance Constitution, which Brzezinski's analysis underappreciates. The extent of civil and reli gious freedom was virtually unmatched anywhere else in the world at the time. And Polish libertarianism became a source of Polish political influence in Western Europe. For not only did West Euro pean intellectuals flock to Poland to take advantage of its freedoms Brzezinski briefly discusses Goslicki and his theory of govern ment limited by the rule of law (pp. 35-36) . But Goslicki's writings did much more than exemplify Poland's democracy of the gentry; they were highly influential in exporting Polish democratic ideas throughout Europe. Goslicki intended his De op timo Senatore52 as a primer on good government,53 but it was also to be an original and influential work of political philosophy. Presaging the Enlight enment, Goslicki equated godliness with reason and reason with law.54 He argued for the rule of law as a constraint on both Parliament and the Crown. And he asserted the ultimate sover eignty of the people in no uncertain terms:
50. Wawrzyniec Goslicki was of noble lineage, born near Plock, and educated in Krak6w, Padua, and Bologna, from whose university he received a doctorate in civil and canon law in 1566. After completing his education, he travelled to Rome, where he wrote the book that brought him fame across Europe: De optimo Senatore ("The Accomplished Senator"). 51. Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski was born in Wolborz, in central Poland, in 1503. His fam· ily was of noble origins but modest means. They sent Andrzej at age 11 to study at the Jagiellonian University in Krak6w, which was then at the height of its prestige as the center for humanistic learning in Europe. After completing his education there, in 1523 Frycz Modrzewski entered the service of Primate Jan Laski. This led to a life-long relationship with the Laski family, who served as Frycz Modrzewski's protectors in Poland after he began publishing his legal and political tracts. Like Frycz Modrzewski, the I:.. askis were reform· minded; unlike him, they were immensely powerful.
Under Primate l.aski's auspices, the young Frycz Modrzewski travelled abroad exten· sively, particularly to France and Germany, where he studied for some time at the University of Wittenberg. While there, he served as the Primate's emissary to the German protestants.
After returning to Poland, in 1547 Frycz Modrzewski became secretary to King Zygmunt August and carried out several diplomatic missions on his behalf. It was only toward the end of his career that Frycz Modrzewski began to write and publish tracts concerning the nature of government and international law. 57. Two English translations of De op timo Senatore appeared in London in 1598 (re printed in 1607) and 1733, respectively. By all accounts, the 1598 translation {which hardly deserves to be called a "translation" for all of its "politically correct" editorial changes and errors) was widely read.
First published in Latin in
58. In 1597 England was at war with Spain, and domestic confl ict was increasing between the English Crown and the opposition, leading ultimately to civil war in 1642. The English Crown feared that Poland might ally militarily with Spain because the Polish and Spanish Kings were related by marriage and English pirates had been intercepting and confiscating Polish shipments of food and building materials bound for Spain. Any Polish political tract published in England at that time was bound to find an interested audience. With respect to England's domestic political turmoil, Goslicki's book, which denied absolute monarchy and the divine right of Kings, was hardly favorable to Queen Elizabeth or the early Stuarts {who reigned from 1603). In particular, Goslicki's assertion of popular sovereignty directly contra dicted the absolutist claims of the early Stuarts, James I and Charles I. See, e.g., James I, A Speach to the Lords and Commons of the Parliament at White-Hall (1609), reprinted in 1 THE PoLmCAL WRITINGS OF JAMES I 306, 307 (Charles Howard Mcilwain ed., 1918) (assert ing that the monarch is the sole fount of the constitution, law, and justice). And his assertion of a right of resistance against tyrannical kings supported the antiroyalist movement that arose in opposition to the early Stuarts and their assertions of absolutism; Goslicki's book was widely quoted and cited in antiroyalist pamphlets and leaflets. See Ftlipowicz, supra note 52, at 239.
59. In fact, Shakespeare scholars in both England and Poland have acknowledged an im portant connection between the appearance of Goslicki's book in England in 1598 and Shakespeare's masterpiece, Hamlet.
In 1904 Professor Israel Gollancz of Cambridge University first suggested that Shakespeare not only read Goslicki but actually met him when Goslicki served, for a brief time, as emissary to the Court of St. James. See Israel Gollancz, Bits of Tim ber: Some Obser vations on Shakespearean Na mes -'Shylock'; 'Polonius'; 'Malvolio', in A BooK OF HOM AGE TO SHAKESPEARE 170, 174-77 (Israel Gollancz ed., 1916) ; see also Ftlipowicz, supra note 52, at 239-40. This is speculative. What is not speculative, however, is that Shakespeare greatly expanded the role of the King's counsellor in the second edition of Hamlet, which appeared after the publication of Goslicki's book in England, and Shakespeare renamed the counsellor Polonius (Latin for "a Pole"). See 7 NARRA TIVE AND DRAMATIC SouRCES OF SHAKESPEARE 44-45 (Geoffrey Bullough ed., 1973); Ftlipowicz, supra note 52, at 239-40; Gollancz, supra, at 174.
Polonius was, of course, a figure of derision and ridicule in Hamlet, described by the prince as "a foolish prating knave." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET [Vol. 97:2062 democratic and libertarian constitutional ideas it exported helped to fuel the antiroyalist opposition movement in the decades leading up to the civil war of 1642.
Equally influential were the political/constitutional writings of Frycz Modrzewski. In 1543, at the age of forty, he published his first two treatises: Lascius sive de poena homicidii, an indictment of class-based inequality in Polish criminal law, and Oratio Philaletis Peripetici, in which he defended the political rights of Poland's townspeople. Then, in 1551 Frycz Modrzewski wrote the work which brought him fame throughout Europe, Commentariorum de Republica emendanda libri quinque. Initially suppressed by the Catholic clergy, the complete book was first published in Basel in 1554. It became widely available in Poland the same year. Its theme was the improvement of church and state through reform of customs, laws, the church, schools, and methods of warfare.6° Strongly influenced by Erasmus, whose entire library the La skis PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 4. (Jack Randall Crawford ed., 1917) . Was this also Shake speare's commentary on Goslicki's book? Or was Shakespeare merely ridiculing a common type of courtier who Goslicki himself caricatured? Not surprisingly, English and Polish com mentators have interpreted the role of Polonius in Hamlet differently.
The English Shakespeare scholar, Geoffrey Bullough, interprets Shakespeare's treatment of Goslicki this way:
The verbose style of the [1598] translation and the somewhat commonplace worldly wis dom of the contents make it almost certain that Shakespeare enlarged the part of the spying courtier in the light of it, mocking where it praised the stateman's wariness, sen tentiousness and gravity, and making Hamlet take the side of that objector to the coun sellor's 'philosophy' who declares, 'that arte of thine is rather to be tearmed the science of prating, then a knowledge whereby men attaine unto felicitie' •.
•. The name 'Polonius' attached to such a character would have comic point only after the publication of Goslicius' book and when the dispute with Poland was still fresh, i.e., 1598-1602. 7 NARRATIVE AND DRAMATIC SOURCES OF SHAKESPEARE, supra , at 46.
The Polish Shakespeare scholar, Witold Chwalewik, provides a very different interpretation of Goslicki's effect on Shakespeare:
The objection equally obvious and seemingly crushing is that the figure Shakespeare has drawn, clearly with a critical intention, does not at all resemble the ideal portrait Goslicki is concerned to present. And it has to be admitted that the two are, in fact, quite unlike. What has been overlooked, however, is that Goslicki's work, besides the ideal norm, contains also a sketched-in caricature, and that this fits the facts of the case perfectly. ANGLO-POLISH RENAISSANCE TEXTS, supra note 52, at 33-34; see also Laurentius Grimaldus Goslicius, Th e Counsellor, reprinted in ANGLO-POLISH RENAISSANCE TEXTS, supra note 52, at 45, 93. What Bullough neglects, according to Chwalewik's interpretation, are important textual similarities between the 1598 translation of De op timo Senatore and Hamlet. For example, just as Hamlet castigates Po lonius for being a "following prating Knave," Goslicki derides common courtiers (in contrast to his ideal counsellor) as "pratling Orators and wit less Philosophers." Id. at 93. Chwalewik points to this and other textual similarities between De op timo Senatore and Hamlet to argue that Shakespeare was not ridiculing Goslicki's polit ical philosophy but was simply adapting (or appropriating) Goslicki's portrayal of a common type of inferior counsellor.
Whichever {if either) interpretation is correct, the important point for present purposes is that Goslicki's book made a significant impression in England when it was first translated and published there in 1598.
60. See Waldemar Vo ise, Polish Renaissance Political Th eory: Andrzej Fry cz Modrzewsk� in THE PoLISH RENAISSANCE, supra note 28, at 174, 175.
had purchased and brought to Poland, in de Republica emendanda Frycz Modrzewski attacked the unwise, inane, and grossly inequit able political and social customs of his own country. In particular, he took on his own class, the ruling szlachta. Just as the Polish no bility denied the inborn superiority of kings, so Frycz Modrzewski rejected the inborn superiority of the nobility in calling for a state governed by men distinguished by merit rather than birth. As merit required education, Fr ycz Modrzewski became the first among the humanists to call for secular control of schools and education di rected toward public service.
While the most influential parts of de Republica emendanda were those that dealt with war and its resolution, 6 1 Frycz Modrzewski's book was at least equally concerned with internal state conflicts. Believing that all social classes were necessary for the efficient and virtuous functioning of the state, he condemned any oppression, especially of the peasantry, and called for the aboli tion of serfdom. Fr ycz Modrzewski argued that the peasant should own his land, free from seizure by his lord, and be free to leave at all times.
Frycz Modrzewski also believed strongly in equality before the law. Echoing his earlier pamphlet, Lascius sive de poena homicidii, he argued in de Republica emendanda that all citizens, be they no blemen or peasants, should be entitled to justice. If the law must discriminate, he contended, then it should punish more severely the magnates and governors who commit crimes though they have less reason to do so. Moreover, Frycz Modrzewski championed free dom of expression, especially the freedom to criticize the ruling classes, including the King: "Rulers who are not prepared to toler ate freedom of speech," he argued, "should govern over 'dumb ani mals' and not over intelligent men."62
By the beginnin g of the seventeenth century, de Republica emendanda had appeared in Spanish and German translations; it 61. Frycz Modrzewski believed that the only way one state could convince its neighbors of its peaceful intentions was to resist war at all costs. Presaging the 1573 Warsaw Confederation by a generation, he argued that religious differences should never serve as grounds for war. For international disputes, he reco=ended specific procedures for media tion: each party to a conflict would choose a "j udge" who, released from his oath of loyalty to his own King during the period of mediation, might secure a timely and just settlement. Each nation would then be bound by the judges' ruling, as by a treaty. In case negotiations failed, Frycz Modrzewski maintained, like Grotius after him, that a just war could not be lost and an unjust war could not be won. See Grotius' VIA AD PACEM ECCLESIASTICAM (1642) (expressing the same attitude and frequently citing Modrzewski). A war was just only if undertaken as a last resort to avenge pernicious wrongs. Thus, for Frycz Modrzewski, war was "an act designed to administer justice in international relations." Voise, supra note 60, at 184.
62 Between the end of the sixteenth century and the enactment of Poland's landmark Constitution of 1791, political and economic conditions deteriorated. As Brzezinski puts it, "the important, but unrefined, constitutional reforms developed in Poland during the thirteenth through sixteenth centuries became distorted in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, leading to an inefficient and ineffective Polish government" (p. 39). The balance of powers that had existed during the sixteenth century tilted in creasingly toward the nobility, which curtailed the King's authority and limited state power to such extents that the Polish-Lithuanian Republic grew too weak to defend itself against increasingly power ful foreign aggressors (p. 39). As a result, from the end of the six teenth to the middle of the eighteenth century, Poland lost half its territory to Russia, Sweden, Prussia, and Au stria-Hungary.
The chief institutional vill ain in Brzezinski's story, which reflects the standard account of the demise of the balance of power in Poland during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is the liberum veto. As noted earlier,65 the veto required unanimity for legislative action; a single dissenting member of the Sejm could block legislative action and even dissolve an entire session of Parlia ment. Indeed, according to Brzezinski, the liberum veto caused the adjournment without action of forty-eight out of fifty-five biennial 63. In 1576, the Fr enchman Jean Bodin wrote in Six Books of the Republic: '"The Polish writer Andreas Fricius even writes that it is an allegedly great mistake not to apply the same punishment to patricians and plebeians, the rich and poor, citizens and foreigners; nothing more absurd could have been written by anyone who, like him, wishes to shape the laws and customs of his Republic."' Quoted in Vo ise, supra note 60, at 186. But then, as Fr ycz Modrzewski's biographer, Waldemar Vo ise has observed, critics in the same era also con demned as absurd the ideas of the Polish astronomer Copernicus. Id. at 187.
64. These included the King's Chancellor Jan Zamoyski, the Protestant Andrzej Wolan, and Stanislaw Sokolowski, who wrote of the strict correlation between liberty and equality.
65. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
meetings of the Sejm held after 1652 (p. 39). But abuse of the veto was as much a symptom as a cause of Poland's political problems.
According to Wenceslas J. Wagner, the general repudiation of the veto is historically myopic: "[H]istory shows that for many long years there was no abuse of the veto in Poland." Before 1652 "the deputy who had an opinion different from the others was giving up his point of view if he knew that he was isolated and his approach was contrary to that of the others -and did not use his right to the veto."66 Wagner's view is not wholly accurate, however. As Norman Davies has explained, the liberum veto created several "diffi culties in the early decades of the Republic, including one in 1580 which blocked all taxation for that year."67 Davies concurs, however, in Wagner's general assessment of the veto, noting that before the mid-seventeenth century it "[u]sually ... produced noth ing more than a temporary delay," as the marshal of the Sejm worked to negotiate a resolution to the conflict.68 It is also impor tant to remember that the liberum veto existed during the period when the Polish-Lithuanian Republic blossomed into the largest and most powerful country in Europe. So it could not have been the very existence of the institution that caused the state to weaken substantially during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
What did change between the sixteenth and eighteenth centu ries was the way in which the liberum veto was used and its conse quences. Before the 1652 Sejm the veto was used only to block individual legislative initiatives; in that year it was used for the first time to negate the Diet's entire agenda and dissolve the session.69 As Wagner explains, the liberum veto changed into a "liberum rumpo ... causing the dissolution of the Diet and the annihilation of all its decisions, making its deliberations fruitless."70 This was to the great advantage of the Republic's foreign enemies, who "re tained magnates who could break the Sejm at the drop of a ducat."71 Consequently, as Brzezinski notes (p. 39), most subse quent meetings of the Sejm were broken, causing the Polish state to grow ever weaker, less able to defend itself against foreign influ ence and, ultimately, incursion.
Whether the liberum veto was a cause or merely a symptom of the demise of the first Polish Republic is unclear. But the liberum veto was hardly the only cause of Poland's de mise at the end of the eighteenth century. In fact, abuse of the veto coincided with a general erosion of civil and religious liberties in Poland, which gave way before a burgeoning and increasingly ma levolent Polish nationalism that itself was a symptom of foreign agi tation. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Polish state grew less and less tolerant of "non-Poles" (especially Jews) and religious dissidents. Freedom of speech and religion were restricted. Ironically, this took place in Poland just as other European countries were moving towards the increased liberalism of the Enlightenment. Goslicki, Frycz Modrzewski, Sokolowski, and Myszkowski. Ironi cally, many of the truly novel ideas found in the 1791 Constitution -the true products of the Polish "Enlightenment" -appear re gressive in light of Poland's earlier constitutional history. These re gressive ideas included the reinstitution of hereditary monarchy and restrictions on religious freedom.
Brzezinski applauds the 1791 Constitution for ostensibly creat ing "a clear right to religious freedom" (p. 44) , but the extent of the right was anything but clear. In fact, Article I of the Constitution expressly limited religious freedom to practices "according to the laws of the country."73 In other words, the Constitution guaranteed only as much religious freedom as state policy sanctioned. Such an empty guarantee was worthy of Poland's infamous Communist Constitution of 1952.74 Moreover, the 1791 Constitution outlawed dissidence by prohibiting conversion from Roman Catholicism to any other creed, thus abrogating religious liberties agreed to by the 1573 Warsaw Confederation.75 The 1791 Constitution also adopted in full the Cities Act, enacted earlier that year by the Sejm, which, among other things, limited habeas corpus protections and denied Jews citizenship in cities. Thus, 1791 marked a sea-change in offi cial Polish-Jewish relations. The Cities Act and the Constitution re flected the rise of anti-Semitism among the higher estates. Finally, the Constitution marked the end of unity among the nobility, as "r oughly 400,000 propertyless nobles lost their political rights and declined to the status of free citizens in either the burgher or peas ant estate depending on residence and occupation."76 These more regressive, antidemocratic, and antilibertarian fea tures of Poland's 1791 Constitution reflected a burgeoning Polish nationalism. Despite professions of respect for religious minorities, the authors of the 1791 Constitution proved themselves to be less than tolerant. For example, Father Hugo Koll�taj , "[a] leading member of the Polish En lightenment" and "m ajor architect" of the 1791 Constitution,77 proposed compulsory assimilation of Jews and declared that "' [a ]11 those Jews permanently or temporarily settled in the states of the Commonwealth, without exception, are to shave their beards, cease to wear Jewish robes, and wear those that are used by Christians in the states of the Commonwealth."'78 Not At the end of Wo rld War I the Allied forces jointly guaranteed the "'restoration of Poland in its historical and geographic lim its.' "85 This was easier said than done. Different regions of the newly reunited country had been subj ect for more than a century to the disparate social, cultural, economic, political, and legal norms of three foreign sovereigns: Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary. Under the circumstances, it is remarkable that the process of constitution-drafting, which began in 1919, took only two years to complete.
Brzezinski is critical of the final product, the 1921 Constitution, because, in his view, the legislative branch it created was too strong and the executive was too weak (pp. 48-49). Consequently, the Constitution "provided a political structure that sowed the seeds of ineffective government, reminiscent of pre-1791 Poland" (p. 51). What the newly reborn Polish state needed most was stability, which the 1921 Constitution failed to provide.
Brzezinski's assessment of the 1921 Constitution is overly harsh. In Poland's circumstances, it is doubtful that any constitution, no matter how well structured and balanced its system of govern mental powers, could have provided sufficient stability. There were simply too many political and, especially, economic problems that could not be resolved by constitution writing. And, to its credit, the 1921 Constitution was an entirely modem and democratic constitu tion, far closer in letter and spirit to Poland's new 1997 Constitution The 1921 Constitution continued many of the traditions of Poland's earlier constitutions, including legislative supremacy but with a broader democratic focus. The 1921 Constitution was the first in Poland's history to reject monarchy altogether and establish participatory democracy based on proportional representation re gardless of social class. In the king's place sat a weak president, clearly subservient to Parliament. The Sejm had sole responsibility for the national budget, constitutional amendments, the army, and taxation. " [A] simple majority vote of the Sejm could force a single minister, the entire executive cabinet, or even the President, to re sign" (p. 49). The president, by contrast, could not dissolve the Sejm; he did not even possess authority to veto legislation. In time of war, the president could not serve as commander-in-chief of the armed forces but could only appoint one upon the recommendation of the Council of Ministers (the prime minister's cabinet). And, as Brzezinski points out, the Council of Ministers was directly answer able to the Sejm, not to the president (p. 50). In sum, the presi dent's role was purely formal.
This was by design. Poland's constitution drafters feared that a strong presidency might "allow a single dynamic leader," specifi cally Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, "to dominate the government" (p. 50). Pilsudski was the charismatic hero of Poland's 1920 war against Russia, the head of Poland's provisional government, and a self styled (non-Marxist) socialist. By creating a weak presidency, Pilsudski's opponents managed to dissuade him from participating in the government. Was the cost of this an "impotent 'sejmocracy,' " as Brzezinski (following Pilsudski) alleges (p. 48)?
It is not at all clear that the unbalanced political structure cre ated by the 1921 Constitution was a significant cause of Poland's travails during the interwar period. Consider the circumstances. Poland was attempting to rebuild (or more accurately, to build for the first time) a modern state and economy after a century-and-a-quarter of foreign rule, in postwar circumstances of massive geographical and economic dislocation and differentiation, high inflation, internal ethnic strife, as well as military hostility from Russia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania. That Poland managed to rebuild itself at all is remarkable enough. And, when viewed in its historical context, Poland's 1921 Constitution is a remarkable document. It subordinated the executive government to a bicameral Sejm elected by universal suffrage, gu aranteed the legal equality and protection by the State of al l citizens irrespective of 'origin, nationality, language, race, or reli gion'; the abolition of hereditary and class privileges and titles; the rights of property, whether private or collective; the regulation of land-owning with a view to creating 'private farming units capable of adequate productivity'; the rights of free expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of conscience, and religious practice; the right to unemployment and sickness benefit, to protec tion against the abuses of child, female, and inju rious employment, to education at the expense of the state; and the retention by Minorities of thei r specific nationality, language, and character.87
Unfortunately, this liberal-democratic constitution with its promise of a welfare state was implemented in a political climate of nationalism and radicalisms of all stripes. Beyond the passage of the Constitution itself, disparate political parties could not agree on the nature or direction of state policies. Economic conditions, meanwhile, were horrendous. Already high rates of unemployment and inflation were growing ever higher; investment capital was in short supply; and Poland's economy was underindustrialized. Norman Davies does not exaggerate when he suggests that "[i]n the first years of the Republic's existence, the entire economic system had to be constructed from scratch."88 What constitution in the world could have ensured stability under such circumstances? Ar guably, Poland's first postpartition governments faced greater chal lenges than those that confronted the first postcommunist government of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in 1989.
The political and economic problems that plagued successive governments in postpartition Poland, along with the perceived need for institutional reforms, led Marshal Pilsudski to stage a coup in 1926.89 Afterwards, he established a new political party, the Bezpartyjny Blok Wsp 6lpracy z Rzqdem (The Nonparty Block for Cooperation with the Government, or BBWR), to govern the coun- Pilsudski and his party soon grew dissatisfied with the 1926 Amendments to the 1921 Constitution; they called for a completely new constitution to provide even more executive authority, so that the President could "act effectively and decisively" to solve the na tion's economic problems (p. 53). The result was the 1935 Constitu tion, which declared that "the one and undivided power of the state was concentrated in the person of the President of the Republic and that the government, the sejm, the senate, the armed forces, the tribunals, and the state audit were subordinate to him.'' The Presi dent, meanwhile, was made answerable only to "God and his tory. "92 Brzezinski quite rightly labels the 1935 Constitution "undemocratic" (p. 55). It marked "a decisive break with liberal parliamentarism" (p. 56), which had been a consistent feature of Polish constitutions since the sixteenth century.
Ironically, Pilsudski died just three weeks after the 1935 Consti tution was enacted, leaving Poland leaderless. In the new constitu tional system the Sejm was too weak to run the country; the President held the lion's share of power. Pilsudski, however, had been the only man in Poland popular and charismatic enough to 
1944-1989
All of Poland's constitutional history to this point is covered in one brief chapter of Brzezinski's book. Ironically, he subsequently devotes an entire chapter to constitutional theory and practice in communist Poland, where constitutional law mattered less than Party policy, and where both were largely dictated from Moscow. Ye t Poland's Communist Constitution of 1952 is undeniably part of Poland's constitutional heritage. At some level a constitution is a constitution regardless of its pedigree, its political legitimacy, or even its legal status.
Brzezinski is plainly ambivalent about the constitution of Poland under communism. Indeed, his title for the chapter, "From Constitutionalism to To talitarianism," implies that constitutional ism and communism are antithetical. And Brzezinski notes, "the promulgation of a communist constitution in 1952 resulted in the rejection of the fundamental themes of constitutionalism" (p. 72). Indeed, the very notion of communist constitutionalism is paradoxical.
More important than the paradox of communist constitutional ism for Brzezinski's purposes is to understand that constitutional developments in postcommunist Poland have not been sui generis, 93 but have evolved within preexisting institutional and historical con texts. An important theme of Brzezinski's book appears for the first time in the chapter on People's Poland: the continuity of insti tutions across historical epochs.94 In order to understand constitu- Poland's 1952 Constitution was, in Brzezinski's words, "pat terned on the Soviet Constitution of 1936, retaining much of the original language of that document and reflecting major inputs by Soviet constitutional theorists."95 It was, indeed, "a Polish language equivalent of the Soviet Constitution" (p. 63). Despite its liberal democratic pretenses -provisions ostensibly guaranteeing univer sal suffrage and freedom of speech, religion, and assemblyPoland's 1952 Constitution created a power structure, through insti tutions such as "socialist democracy" and "socialist legality," which vested all power in the Communist Party.
Actually, the Constitution did not so much create as reflect the reality of Communist hegemony. To claim that the 1952 Constitu tion vested power in Poland's Communist Party would be to invert cause and effect. The Party already had power, which it used to foist the Constitution on a disaffected population. It was not the Constitution that gave power to the Party but the Party that gave power to the Constitution.
Poland's 1952 Constitution was not a constitution in the liberal democratic sense of "the highest law of the land." In fact, it was hardly a legal document at all. The various powers it created and the rights and liberties it supposedly guaranteed were not self executing but had to be implemented by "'ordinary statutes and other normative acts.' "96 And the Constitution did not require the enactment of implementing legislation. So, it was entirely without legal force, except to the extent the Party/state chose to enforce it. And that, of course, was a matter of policy rather than law. Conse quently, in People's Poland there was no constitutional law, only constitutional policy. And that policy was determined, and subject to change at any time, by the PZPR in consultation with its "frater nal ally" in Moscow.
In 1976 the Constitution was amended, in part to better reflect this reality. The Amendments "formally recognized the Party's political monopoly" by institutionalizing its "'leading role' " in the the co=unist era to the postco=unist era); KAzIMIERZ Z. PoZNANSKI, PoLANo's PRO· TRACTED TRANsmoN (1996) (claiming that Poland's transition to market democracy had its roots in economic and institutional reforms of the early 1980s).
P. 63. The 1952
Constitution is codified at 1952 Dz. U. No. 33, item 232. For an English-language translation of the Constitution (as amended in 1954, 1957, 1960, 1961, and 1963) , see Ill AMos J. PEASLEE, CONSTITlITIONS OF NATIONS 709 (1968). building of socialism.97 And they "enshrined Poland's fraternal ties with the Soviet Union."9 8 In the eyes of many Poles, this implicit subordination of national sovereignty to a historical foe constituted an act of treason by the PZPR. Thus, the 1976 Amendments ac complished what was seemingly impossible: they further discred ited Poland's Communist Constitution. They also catalyzed opposition to the communist regime (pp. 73-74) . Within a year af ter the 1976 Constitutional Amendments were enacted, the Party was "confronted by a united and nationally-based organization making fundamental political and economic demands" (p. 74). Within three years, this organization evolved into the national movement known as Solidarity, which ultimately toppled the PZPR from power.
P. 66 (quoting in translation
The 1952 Constitution was amended again in 1982, during the period of martial law. These Amendments are quite significant for Brzezinski's history of constitutionalism in Poland because they in clude two provisions that exemplify his theme of institutional con tinuity across historical epochs. The 1982 Amendments authorized the creation of two organizations "characteristic of Western demo cratic constitutionalism": a Constitutional Tribunal and a Tr ibunal of State. Although scholars have debated the value of these organi zations within the communist system,99 there is no denying that they have evolved into important institutional components of Poland's postcommunist constitutional democracy.
The 1982 Constitutional Amendments created a nominally in dependent Constitutional Tribunal to replace the Tribunal of State as arbiter of the Constitution. 100 The Tr ibunal was charged with reviewing the constitutionality of statutes and executory regula tions. Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, though, it was not the final arbiter of Poland's Constitution; Tribunal deci sions could be overruled by a simple majority vote of the Sejm. As Brzezinski notes, "[t]hroughout its existence, the Tr ibunal's practice of judicial review has been curbed by limitations included in the Vol. 97:2062 19 85 Act to ensure that the Tribunal would not emancipate it self nor overstep politically acceptable limits" (p. 158 ). The very ex ist ence of a Constitutional Tribunal, however, seemed at odds wit h communist constitutional practice. The notion that st atutes should have to conform to the Constitution was absurd in a system where, as already noted, ordinary legislation had higher legal st atus than constitutional provisions.
Ironically, the creation of the Constitutional Tribunal itself ex emplified the higher legal status of ordinary legislation. The Tribunal existed only on constitutional paper for three years before the Sejm enacted legislation actually instituting it in 19 85. (One wonders whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicat e the constitutionality of its own enabling statute.) The quest ion begs an swering: What could it mean for a statute to be unconst itutional in a system where ordinary statutes possessed higher legal aut hority than constitutional provisions? Brzezinski does not provide an an swer to this question but notes: " 101. Brzezinski supports this claim by pointing to cases wherein the Tr ibunal limited agency powers to those expressly delegated by statutes. P. 159. On the other hand, as he also notes, of the 33 cases the Tr ibunal reviewed between 1986 and the fall of communism in 1989, only three concerned the constitutionality of legislative enactments, and only one of those was held "'partially inconsistent'" with the Constitution. P. 158. It is also worth noting that although the Constitutional Tr ibunal could pass judgment on the constitutionality of statu tory enactments and administrative regulations, neither it nor any other court in the land had the authority to require administrators to promulgate or enforce regulations under statutory directives. See, e.g., CoLE, supra note 94, at 151 (describing how administrators could not be sued for failing to promulgate or enforce environmental regulations). This would seem to be a prerequisite to the observance of law and practice of good government. I think the most that can accurately be said for the Constitutional Tr ibunal in the first stage of its existence under communism is that it subjected, to some extent, the executive branch of government to greater parliamentary control. Of course, this in itself was no mean feat.
The 1982 Constitutional Amendments also authorized a new Tr ibunal of State, "a quasi-judicial 'impeachment court' " designed to hold state officials criminally responsible for official misconduct (p. 77). Before the fall of communism, this organization proved to be even less significant than the Constitutional Tr ibunal. As Brzezinski explains (p. 78), its jurisdiction was limited; neither members of Parliament nor party members who did not hold state offices could be indicted for corruption. And when the Tr ibunal of State indicted a former Prime Minister and other state officials in 1984, the Sejm passed a General Amnesty Law barring further pro ceedings. Thus, "the Tr ibunal of State did not contribute to any substantial modification of communist political arrangements" (p. 78). Like the Constitutional Tr ibumµ, however, this organization has evolved in postcommunist Poland to provide an important check on government abuse of power and corruption.
One more seed of liberal-democracy was sown before the end of the communist era when, in 1987, the Sejm created the office of the Ombudsman for Citizens' Rights, which Brzezinski calls "the first independent position in the communist bloc designed to protect cit izens from abuses of government power and violations of their con stitutional rights by state officials" (p. 79). Although the Ombudsman was created not by constitutional amendment but by ordinary legislation, it was an immensely important development for Polish constitutionalism. The Sejm gave the Ombudsman power to receive citizens' complaints of human rights and constitutional violations; to petition the Sejm for legislative remedies; to petition the Constitutional Tr ibunal to review state actions that allegedly vi olate constitutional rights; and to bring criminal,_ civil, or adminis trative court actions on behalf of citizens or organizations (p. 79).
To gether, the three new organizations instituted by constitu tional amendment or legislation during the 1980s -the Constitutional Tr ibunal, the Tr ibunal of State, and the Ombudsman -had great significance for communism in Poland. In particular, they constituted tacit repudiation of certain of its fundamental ten ets, including the conception of a communist state devoid of social and political discord.1°2 . On a more practical -that is, legallevel, their significance in the Polish People's Republic was dubious. Brzezinski focuses on the successes of the Constitutional Tr ibunal and Ombudsman during the second half of the 1980s. He notes (p. 73) that "the Tr ibunal issued a number of important decisions ad dressing bureaucratic and executive branch arbitrariness." Mean while, Poland's first Ombudsman, the respected legal scholar Ewa 102. This was also reflected in other institutional changes in the 1980s, including the crea tion in 1980 of a High Administrative Court to adjudicate disputes between citizens and administrative agencies. See pp. 139-40.
L�towska, "aggressively push [ ed] for constitutional and political re forms," including Polish government acceptance of international human rights standards (p. 80). She also "vigorously challenged un constitutional state acts before the Constitutional Tr ibunal" (p. 80). Brzezinski realizes, however, that these successes were necessarily limited because the Constitutional Tr ibunal and Ombudsman were inherently at odds with the political system in which they operated. The Polish state was still very much a Party/state, with the PZPR tightly grasping the reins of power. As Brzezinski concludes, "up to 1989 Party structures and not the constitution provided the key to understanding politics and state policy-making in Poland" (p. 81).
The various constitutional and legal, not to mention economic, reforms of the 1980s after the end of martial law signified the slow demise of the communist system. They also, however, marked the first steps of transition to a new, more liberal, and more democratic political system. When the system changed in 1989, these and other organizations and institutions that had been marginal at best under communism became fundamental.
THE EIGHT-YEAR STRUGGLE FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION IN PosTCOMMUNIST POLAND
The best and biggest part of Brzezinski's book is his detailed account of Poland's efforts after the fall of communism to establish a constitutional order that, at once, respected Poland's legacy of constitutionalism and recognized that old formulations are often unsuited to modern problems of government. Poland's circum stances and constitutional ambitions at the end of the communist era were obviously not the same as in 1791, 1921, or 1952 . A new Polish Republic required a new constitution -virtually everyone agreed about that. On all other matters, however, from the struc ture of government to the nature (positive vs. negative) of constitu tional rights, to the process for adopting a new constitution, there was no consensus. Consequently, it took Poland eight years follow ing the fall of communism to adopt a wholly new constitution.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, while western economists ar gued for the quickest possible privatization of economic activity and the creation of market institutions, political scientists and soci ologists urged the rapid development of institutions promoting civil society, and liberal legal scholars promoted the immediate adoption of new constitutions to organize state power around liberal democratic institutions. Yale Law School Professor Bruce Ackerman argued forcefully for the primacy of constitution writing:
Neither the privatization of the economy nor the construction of civil society should preoccupy revolutionaries first and foremost. How ever much liberals may want to think about such things, the organiza-tion of state power deserves immediate concern. The window of opportunity for constitutionalizing liberal revolution is open for a shorter time than is generally recognized. Unless the constitutional moment is seized to advantage, it may be missed entirely. In contrast, constructing a liberal market economy, let alone a civil society, re quires decades, perhaps generations, and the project can easily be un dermined without the timely adoption of an appropriate constitutional framework. 1 03
Accepting, for the sake of argument, Ackerman's claim of the pri mary importance of constitutionalizing a framework within which market institutions and civil society can develop, the question re In both cases, it was far from an easy process.
Brzezinski tells the story of Poland's "democratic rebirth and constitutional reform," relating in detail the various political machi nations, false starts, and crises of legitimation that dogged the pro cess. This is the most valuable part of his book because much of the story has not been told before. And it is a story Brzezinski knows and tells well. He lived in Warsaw from 1991 to 1995 as a Fulbright Scholar and Soros Lecturer, and, as one reviewer explains, Brzezinski "was a friend to and an intellectual resource for many of the writers of the new Polish constitution." tos His book vividly por trays the political travails of constitution writing, illustrating an old adage that it is easier for disparate parties to unite against a com mon foe than fo r a common good. As various Solidarity-based gov ernments in postcommunist Poland discovered, it was far easier to fight together against communism than to rule.
Under the circumstances, the remarkable thing is not that it took Poland eight years to adopt a new constitution but that it took Poland only eight years to adopt a new constitution. In those eight years, Poland had three different parliaments and, depending on how one counts, at least six diff erent governments. At its smallest, 103. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 46-47 (1992) . 104. They began with a protoconstitution, the Articles of Confederation, in 1787 (ratified in 1781). This scheme, however, created a national government so weak as to be unviable. In a sense, America under the Articles of Confederation was like Poland under the "Small Con stitution" adopted in 1989. In both cases, they were temporary documents needed to buy time for the slower process of developing a more permanent framework for government. And, as Ackerman puts it, the American Articles of Confederation "led to a pervasive polit ical malaise comparable to the feeling in Po land today." Id. at 56.
105. Frederick Quinn , From Communism to Constitutionalism, CoNN. L. TRm., Apr. 6, 1998, at 25 (reviewing Th e Struggle fo r Constitutionalism in Po land).
the Sejm included six different political parties, ranging from the postcommunist SLD and social-democratic UP to the proreform, probusiness UW and the ultranationalist KPN; at its largest, it con tained twenty-nine parties that represented an even broader spec trum of (often radical) interests (pp. 91-93). That such disparate parties could ever come to agree on a single constitutional draft is remarkable in itself. To some extent, they made their own task eas ier by taking their time and going about constitution drafting in a piecemeal fashion. Poland's 1952 Constitution underwent three sets of major amendments after 1989 before it was completely re placed in 1997. Many of the interim changes foreshadowed the new constitutional framework that emerged in 1997.
As Brzezinski explains (pp. 110-11), constitutional amendments of April and December 1989 and the "Small Constitution" of 1992 effectively converted Poland from a communist totalitarian system to a constitutional Rechtstaat. Among other things, the April 1989
Amendments freed the judicial branch of government from political (i.e., Party) control. They didn't just promise judicial independence -the 1952 Constitution did that -but ensured it by giving Supreme Court justices life tenure and "precluding direct contacts between political officials and members of the judiciary" (p. 85).
The state's prosecutors' offices were finally divorced from the courts. In this and other ways, Brzezinski concludes, the April 1989
Amendments "contributed to the restoration of basic elements of the doctrine of separation of powers" and a system of checks and balances (p. 86). They "signified the demise of the Soviet-style gov ernmental system of entirely centralized state authority" (p. 86).
Between the April 1989 and December 1989 Constitutional Amendments, a great deal changed in Poland. In June the Commu nists were swept aside in (semi-) free elections, and Solidarity gained an "effective maj ority" in the new Parliament, though sixty five percent of the seats in the lower house, the Sejm, were held by PZPR-backed candidates. By September a Solidarity activist, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, had become Poland's first noncommunist Prime Minister in more than half a century. Communism in Poland was disintegrating much faster than anyone had dared imagine. As a consequence, the April 1989 Amendments to the 1952 Constitu tion were already obsolete. A brand new constitution was needed to reflect the new political realities in Poland. In recognition that this would take some time, the Sejm enacted another round of in terim amendments to the 1952 Constitution.
The December 1989 Amendments obliterated virtually all rem nants of communism from the Constitution. As Brzezinski explains:
The December Amendments deleted the Constitution's preamble and its first two chapters on the political and socioeconomic system of the Polish People's Republic. They also eliminated the anachronistic clause declaring the Party's 'leading role', expunged the reference to Po land's alliance with the Soviet Union, deleted the clause describing Poland's economy as based on 'socialized means of production' and introduced the principle of the equality of diverse forms of ownership, thus providing a constitutional {oundation for private property and the emerging market economy.1 0 6
The December Amendments also changed the country's name from the Polish People's Republic to the Republic of Poland. Most im portantly, Article One proclaimed Poland "'a democratic state ruled by law, implementing principles of social justice.' " 1 0 7 As Brzezinski notes, this provision evoked the Rechtstaat principle of (West) German constitutional law (p. 88). After 1989, Poland was no longer a communist country. Its con stitutional framework was far closer to those of liberal-democratic countries than to the Soviet Union's. Its economy was no longer socialist. Even before the Mazowiecki government introduced the so-called "shock therapy" package of economic reforms in January 1990, socialism had ended with the introduction of the Law on Eco nomic Activities in January 1989. 108 That law freed most sectors of the economy from centralized planning and resource allocation. Poland's transition to market democracy was underway.
Still, no one believed that the task of constitutional revision was anywhere near complete. As Brzezinski notes, "[ d]espite the sub stantial changes, the 1952 Constitution as amended was never in tended by those on the forefront of Poland's political renewal to be the nation's final constitutional structure" (p. 89). The April and December 1989 Constitutional Amendments were stop-gap meas ures intended primarily to buy time for a more thorough constitu tional rewrite.
In the interim, Poland went through something of a constitu tional crisis. In 1992, the government of Prime Minister Janusz Olszewski continually challenged then President Lech Walctsa's constitutional prerogatives, particularly in the realm of national de fense. Brzezinski refers to a 1992 public opinion poll in which "65 per cent of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the 'political chaos' " (p. 96). Further constitutional amendments were needed to delineate more clearly the balance of powers between president, government, and parliament. In February 1992, the Sejm estab lished a Constitutional Committee to draft a replacement for the 1952 Constitution. Before it could begin drafting a wholly new con stitution, however, the Committee had to deal with the immediate political/constitutional crisis. It did so by enacting the "Small Constitution" of 1992.
From the start, the Small Constitution was viewed as "a 'provi sional measure' until a full constitution could be agreed upon" (p. 98). It was intended to resolve the existing "political paralysis" caused by disputes between President and Parliament by providing "a formula for productive cooperation and equilibrium among the three top state authorities" (p. 98). The Small Constitution "eliminat [ ed] ... the Sejm's former status as the 'highest institution of state authority,' " and created a more balanced power structure between the presidency, the government, and the parliament (p. 99). Thus, Brzezinski concludes, the Small Constitution repre sented "a compromise between presidential and parliamentary sys tems of government" (p. 98).
What made the Small Constitution a "provisional measure" rather than a complete replacement for the 1952 Constitution was its exclusive focus on the state power structure. No attention was paid to constitutional rights and liberties. Provisions of the 1952 Constitution (as amended in 1976) concerning civil and religious rights were left unchanged. President Walctsa attempted to resolve this problem and, for all practical purposes, complete the task of constitutional reform in November 1992, when he introduced into Parliament his "Charter of Rights and Freedoms," which would have become part of the Small Constitution in much the same way that the Bill of Rights became part of the previously adopted American Constitution. Walctsa's proposal took everyone by sur prise, especially those who suspected him of harboring dictatorial ambitions. 10 9 The Charter seemed to contradict his political image: the populist conservative who fancied himself another Pilsudski had suddenly become Poland's "leading representative of social liberalism. " 110 Walctsa's proposed Charter contained "twenty-two basic civil and political rights common to all liberal democracies," including 109. Wal1tsa himself fueled these suspicions. He often pointed out that Marshal Pilsudski was his personal hero; he recreated Pilsudski's political party, the BBWR, in an effort to consolidate his political base; and he averred on several occasions that he would protect Poland should the ex-co=unists attempt to retake power, even by democratic means. freedom of religion, the right to privacy, and freedom from govern ment censorship. 111 It also included a "catalogue of wishes, in par ticular those with which every social liberal identifies, but rather unfeasible and difficult to materialise." 112 These "'economic, social and cultural targets' " were not rights; citizens could not bring suit in court to enforce them, but the government was responsible for attaining them "'according to economic abilities.' " 11 3
Walysa's proposed Charter of Rights and Liberties received a warm welcome in Parliament, but it never became part of Poland's constitutional law. Before it could be enacted Walysa dissolved the Sejm (for unrelated reasons) and called for new elections. After those elections Walysa resubmitted the Charter as part of a larger draft constitution. It was referred to the Constitutional Committee, where it languished, vying for attention with six other draft consti tutions, for the next three years.
In the meantime, Brzezinski suggests, the need for a complete constitutional rewrite became less pressing because "the hybrid framework created by the April and December Amendments and by the Small Constitution provided the groundwork for a modern Polish polity as well as institutional stability during a period of ex traordinary politics" (p. 129). Some of that institutional stability came from organizations that predated the fall of communism in Poland, in particular the Ombudsman and the Constitutional Tr ibunal.
Brzezinski demonstrates in Chapter Six of his book how the Tr ibunal, after 1989, "assumed an active role in constitutional mat ters, instilling normative characteristics into Polish constitutional ism and developing constitutional doctrine in accordance with its understanding of the suprapositive principles of a state ruled by law" (p. 158). In spite of substantive limitations on its jurisdiction that carried over into the early 1990s, the Tr ibunal established in dependent judicial review as a fundamental trait of Polish constitu tionalism. Several of its decisions in the early 1990s enforced constitutional provisions against nonconforming statutes, thereby reinforcing the Rechtstaat clause of the Constitution. The Tr ibunal also supported the separation of powers by preventing the Sejm from delegating to the President the power to remove regular court judges for political reasons. As Brzezinski suggests, the Tr ibunal's assertion of autonomy and its active defense of the Constitution as the highest law of the land "symbolized Poland's transition out of the Soviet-style governmental system of entirely centralized state power to a system of separated powers" (p. 163). Still, the Tribunal was not the final arbiter of Poland's Constitution; a majority of the Sejm still could overrule its decisions. For that and other reasonsespecially the need for a new "bill of rights" -additional constitu tional reforms remained necessary.
Brzezinski comprehensively canvasses the political problems that plagued Poland's efforts to adopt a completely new constitu tion in the years following the enactment of the Small Constitution. There were questions of process as well as substance. Some ques tioned whether the Sejm 's Constitutional Committee was a legiti mate body to draft a constitution even though it did not represent the political viewpoints of all Poles.114 But ultimately, in June 1996, the Constitutional Commission presented a completely new draft constitution for parliamentary approval. The National Assembly approved it on April 2, 1997. Six weeks later, it was ratified in a public referendum by a majority of Poles who cast ballots. It en tered into force on October 17, 1997.
POLAND'S NEW CONSTITUTION
Brzezinski writes little about Poland's 1997 Constitution, which became effective just a few months before his book was published. He provides only a short overview of its main features, including its parliamentary system of government, presidential prerogatives in foreign affairs, the process for enacting constitutional amendments, and its civil rights provisions.115 This is unfortunate because the 114. This question plagued constitution-writing efforts not only in the "Round Ta ble Sejm" elected in 1989 but also in the Sejm elected in 1993. The "Round Ta ble Sejm " lacked legitimacy because it was not elected freely; the electoral rules of the "Round Ta ble Accords" reserved 65 percent of the seats in the lower house of Parliament for ( ex-)Communist Party members. See p. 83. The next round of parliamentary elections in 1991 solved this problem but resulted in a Sejm comprised of 29 parties, which were able to agree on almost nothing because of political and ideological divides. See pp. 91-93. As Brzezinski notes, p. 104, this did not prevent the 1991 Sejm from completing important legislative tasks, including the Small Constitution and new electoral criteria that would likely prevent such a fractured Sejm in the future by limiting entry to those parties that received 5 percent or more of the popular vote (8 percent was required for coalitions of parties). In the subsequent parliamentary elec tions of 1993, only 6 parties managed to cross the 5 (or 8) percent threshold for entry into Parliament. Thus, the new electoral criterion had achieved its purpose: fewer parties were represented in the Sejm, which did not necessarily mean the Sejm was less fragmented or more productive. Indeed, in at least one respect, the 5 (or 8) percent rule made the new Sejm less productive: the work of its Constitutional Committee was slowed by questions of legiti macy because so many parties were excluded from its deliberations. Republic of Poland to be "a democratic state ruled by law and im plementing the principles of social justice. "11 6 Article 7 provides that all state bodies must "function on the basis of, and within the limits of, the law."117 The new Constitution bases Poland's political system on "the separation of and balance [of power] " between four branches of government: the legislative branch, comprised of the Sejm and the Senate, the executive branch of the government under the Prime Minister, the presidency (primarily responsible for for eign affairs), and a truly independent judicial branch.118 The 1997
Constitution provides a framework for a liberal democratic society by guaranteeing traditional personal and political rights and liber ties in Articles 30-63. And it establishes the basis for a free market economy by guaranteeing "the freedom of economic activity."11 9 Presumably, western constitutional law "experts" would not find any of these provisions obj ectionable. But Poland's 1997 Constitution would surely disappoint Judge Posner, Professor Sunstein, and other western advisers who deplore the inclusion of "positive" rights in constitutions.120 An entire sec tion of the Constitution (comprising Articles 64-76) is devoted to "Economic, Social and Cultural Fr eedoms and Rights." These in clude the right to "safe and hygienic conditions o f work,"121 "[e]qual access to health care services, :financed from public funds,"122 the right to "education in public schools ... without pay ment,"123 and the right fo information about "the quality of the en vironment and its protection."124 Given Poland's history of progressive constitutionalism, it was entirely predictable that the new Constitution would include such "positive" rights, regardless of the obj ections of western constitu tional law "experts."125 Indeed, some of the "positive" rights found in Poland's new Constitution have roots in earlier Polish constitu- This should not be understood as an argument in favor of in cluding "positive" rights in Poland's (or any other country's) Constitution. Even some Polish constitutional law exp erts, such as Ewa Lf( towska, have expressed concern that the inclusion of more difficult to enforce "positive" constitutional rights could undermine the enforceability of all constitutional rights. Lf( towska tells a story about a hungry traveler who walks into a Moscow restaurant:
He sits down and inspects the menu. "I'll have the pork chops," he says. "We don't have any," answers the waiter. "Well then, I'll have the meat balls." "We don't have those either." "How about liver then?" "Nope," answers the waiter. The annoyed customer finally asks: "Am I reading the menu or our constitution?" 1 29
Apparently, the drafters of Poland's new Constitution were aware of the danger arising from the combination of "negative" and "positive" rights because they came up with an innovative mecha nism to avoid that danger. Article 8.2 of the Constitution provides:
"The provisions of the Constitution shall apply directly, unless the Constitution provides otherwise."130 This Article in effect bifur cates Poland's Constitution so that, at least with respect to civil rights and liberties, Poland has not one but two new constitutions: one is a traditional bill of rights (American-style), including self executing and directly applicable rights to be free from some gov ernment action. The other is a contemporary (European-style) "wish li�t" of rights to certain services from the government. Those rights (predominantly negative) that are capable of self execution are self-executing; other rights (predominantly positive) requiring affirmative state action are explicitly made subj ect to legislative de-
126.
In any case, one should not make too much of the fact that Poland's 1952 Constitu tion is held in such low esteem. The fact that socio-economic rights were promised but never delivered under communism may, ironically, explain why Polish society demands that they be promised and delivered in postcommunist Poland.
127. This reduces the risk that the legal force of all constitutional rights might be reduced by the combination of (more difficult to enforce) "positive" rights and (more easily enforced and possibly more im portant) "negative" rights. Poland's significant innovation in con stitution writing, if it proves successful in implementation, should influence how other countries draft constitutional rights.134
CONCLUSION

Mark Brzezinski's analysis of Polish constitutional history in
Th e Struggles fo r Constitutionalism in Po land serves a number of valuable purposes. On the most basic level, it expands our knowl edge of an important aspect of one of the most important historical events of the twentieth century: how Poland managed to rebuild constitutional government after more than four decades of commu nist totalitarianism. And it does so in a nuanced way. It was not a simple story of casting off communist shackles and "starting from scratch" in designing constitutional institutions. There was a great deal of historical and institutional baggage, some of which has proved quite useful in postcommunist Poland. Indeed, Poland's constitutional history demonstrates the culturally and historically contingent nature of constitution making.
Brzezinski's historical analysis also adds, though less than it might have, to our understanding of Poland's longer constitutional history, something about which Americans and We st Europeans are woefully ignorant. This ignorance is unfortunate because, as I hope to have shown in this review essay, Poland's history of constitution alism has, overall, been quite innovative and interesting, decidedly western in its orientation, and sometimes internationally influential. 
